



EDUCATION AND LIFE

OR

UNIVERSALIZING

THE

INDIVIDUAL



Education and Life,
OR
Universalizing the Individual

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Examiners' Report.



To the Registrar of the University of Toronto :

We beg to report that the thesis of S. A. Morgan, entitled "Education and Life," considered in connection with the answers given by him to the questions prescribed in the examination, entitles him to the degree of Doctor of Pedagogy, and that according to the statute regarding the ranking of candidates for this degree, he is to be placed in the First Class of Honors.

JOHN WATSON.
J. A. McLELLAN.

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EDUCATION AND LIFE.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

IN a treatise intended as a critical examination of formal education, and of its bearing on the intelligent and moral life, it will not be out of place to begin by defining the limits within which such an investigation should be restricted. The scientific method, whether applied within the physical or the mental domain, demands that fundamental laws should be discovered and established from the analysis and explanation of verified facts. Avoiding, therefore, theoretical speculation on the one hand, and the weighing of conflicting opinions on the other, we shall endeavor to set forth the facts which our subject involves, and to investigate the rational ground for the organization of education into a science of life.

An examination of the history of education in its progress towards an exact science will show that it has adopted the following assumptions as working hypotheses:

- 1st. The science of education postulates a supreme value to self-conscious or spiritual life.
- 2nd. While claiming this supreme value for life, the science must further show that life involves a development toward perfection, which is attainable through effort.
- 3rd. Again, our science postulates that this effort may not lead toward a life of perfection. It recognizes both perfection and imperfection as possible results from the experiences of life, and affirms the perfect life to be desirable.

4th. Finally, it claims to set forth the principles which underlie the realization of the self in its development into a life of perfection, and the general methods in which these principles are to be applied.

The first of these propositions is too self-evident to require demonstration. For, although we may at certain moments ask ourselves, "Is life worth living?", yet reflection shows that the thought involves a contradiction. Our very conception of value implies, "Does this or this possess value in relation to life?" Even the suicide but asks, "Is this state or another the better for *me*?"

This assumption may be further established from a consideration of the facts involved in the doctrine of evolution. Evolution, whatever may have been its errors, has indisputably established the fact that life is to be viewed as a process. As, in this process, the chemical transcends the physical, so the spiritual must transcend the biological. "Life is more than meat."

The remaining claims of the science of education, recognized implicitly by mankind, it will be the effort of the following chapters to establish on an explicit, rational foundation.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONTENT AND RANGE OF CONSCIOUS LIFE.

IT has been noted that the science of education postulates an ideal end for the individual life, and claims that this end may be obtained by a proper development of that life through effort. The attempt to discover a rational ground for this hypothesis will involve an examination into the genesis and content of conscious life, and the circumstances and conditions of its extension. How are these foundation principles of the science to be discovered and established?

Our conscious life is recognized in experience, as single and individual. Investigation shows, however, that, in each of its modes, it presents a variety of aspects, according to the manner in which it is viewed. These are capable of analysis and classification. Without dogmatizing, therefore, at this early stage, in regard to the source or nature of the conscious subject or ego, let us investigate whether such an analysis will afford any explanation of the essence of conscious life, and the field of its possible activities.

Examining the primary facts of conscious life, we discover that they present the following phases or aspects:

- 1st. Every conscious state is a self-conscious state, or stands in an internal relation to the conscious life, as possessing value or interest,—it is an affective state.
- 2nd. These modifications of consciousness present an external aspect, distinguished from their subjective aspect.
- 3rd. Conscious life presents an aspect of impulse or activity, in which the two former aspects, the affective and the objective seek to adjust and identify themselves in the form of knowledge.

These aspects of consciousness further present the following phases :

- (a). On the internal or affective side, conscious life presents unity and continuity throughout its successive modes; while, whatever of diversity or separation appears within it, is referred to the objective aspect.
- (b). Conscious life is not only a unity but an organism. For, though presenting an external aspect in its content, its activity both seeks to adjust this to the internal, and, in its so-called higher functions, readjusts and propagates from within. Thus is indicated the presence of a living principle in conscious life.

Do these facts of experience throw any light on the nature and source of consciousness?

Is conscious life the effect of mechanical causation—the result of physical acting and reacting on physical? If so, conscious facts must be invariable and unchangeable. But, as has been seen, a conscious state possesses an aspect of activity, interacting between its affective and its external phases. It is further seen that, as a result of this activity, a conscious mode may vary in its conditions. These modes were also seen to be capable, by virtue of this activity, of propagation from within. Variability, then, being a quality in conscious life, mechanical causation cannot account for its presence.

Is consciousness non-physical, or a pure subjective state? It has been seen that conscious life displays a tendency to propagate from within. This tendency is also found to express itself in modes of consciousness more markedly affective than those of ordinary experience. Thus is indicated the presence, in consciousness, of a term not physical. These more subjective states, however, find content and expression only in terms of the objective aspect of conscious life. Therefore consciousness cannot be purely subjective.

Thus it is found that conscious life is neither subjective nor objective, but an expression of each—the expression of a relationship between them. Intelligent life, therefore, is an adjustment of subjective to objective, and a perfect life the expression

of a perfect relation between subject and environment. Thus every mental mode finds an explanation of its three aspects through being an expression of this relationship, which relationship seeks to perfect itself impulsively from within. We are now in a position further to affirm that consciousness possesses a germ of causation, which predicates a capacity to become free from within.

Life being thus found to consist in the expression of a relation between subject and object, and to be endowed with an inherent tendency to adjust these into perfect relationship or to formulate the conscious life into perfect knowledge, our next problem will be to discover within what fields the subject may apprehend itself through relationship to the external. Before passing to this point, however, we would pause for a moment to consider whether we are in a position to affirm anything concerning the nature of this external.

It has been seen that the subject or ego realizes itself only in a consciousness resulting from the relating of itself to an external world. It thus appears that the perfection of conscious life must imply, not only a potentiality of perfection in the subject, but also an organized perfection within the outer world. If this perfection does not exist, then the potentiality for a perfect life, inherent in the ego, must, in the present phase of conscious life at least, remain unrealized, through lack of an objective content. If, however, it is found that the subject is capable, through its relating activity, in certain cases to develop consciousness into perfect knowledge, in such a way as to secure perfect freedom from its environment, it will be rational to conclude a universal objective perfection—the goal of the subject's relating activity. Leaving this, therefore, to be decided by the results of our subsequent investigations, we shall now examine under what phases the external world is organized in consciousness; or, in other words, in what fields the subject may realize itself in terms of an external world.

Firstly, the mind is found to realize itself in terms of an objective, physical world. As to the real nature of this physical world, it is not necessary here to speculate. Suffice it to say,

that, in realizing himself, man likewise realizes an objective world possessing interest for the subject. This interest presents itself as pleasurable or painful, as useful or injurious to the conscious subject. Thus there arises, through the impulsive tendency, or causation germ inherent in the ego, an effort to readjust its present relation with its environment, that it may thereby so learn this physical world as to become its master and not remain its servant.

Secondly, among these objects, distinguished as external to the subject, some are recognized as intelligences similar to the self; and, therefore, capable of realizing a like relationship to, and of taking a like interest in the external world. Hence would arise a new series of interests. May not the effort of one individual conflict with the interested effort of another? But a life of perfection cannot exist where individual interests conflict. If, therefore, other intelligences are to be realized in conscious life, these also must be brought into perfect relationship with the subject. Here, also, the freedom of the self must be realized and developed.

Lastly, it has been seen that, in securing its store of experience, the mind, as an organism, further tends to act on these, and propagate from within. Thus there appears a new field of activity—the ideal, or spiritual world. In this spiritual extension of man's conscious life, there are also materials for interpretation and adaptation. Should he, therefore, in these two former spheres, fail to realize that freedom which his inherent power of causation has set as its goal, there yet remains this ideal world toward which his activities may be directed.

Having examined into the nature of conscious life, and having discovered the possible fields of its activities, let us next inquire more closely into the successive steps in the process. From such an inquiry we may the better understand what assistance, if any, formal education is able to afford toward the perfecting of conscious life; and in what ratio these several fields of activity, the physical, the social and the spiritual world, will assist in its attainment.

At this point, a word of explanation may be necessary.

The foregoing division of the world of experience into these several fields is to be viewed, not as actual, but solely for the purpose of scientific treatment. It has been truly said, "The stuff of education, material of education, and end of education are not distinctions of kind, but distinctions of process." Moreover, it is evident that the real work of education is to reconstruct all phases of this world of experience on the basis of man's social life. While, therefore, we shall continue to speak of these several phases of experience as distinct, the assumption will be understood to be thus conditioned.

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CHAPTER III.

THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUS LIFE.

THUS far have been discovered the nature and purpose of conscious life, and the several spheres of its possible development. We must now proceed to an examination of the particular stages through which the individual mind is to advance to a life of perfection.

Conscious life has been seen to consist of an expression of the relation of the subjective mind to an objective world. In every mode of conscious life, we have further noticed an affective quality which makes it a mode of interest. This interest is seen to express itself in an impulsive tendency to establish harmony between the affective, and the external, or non-subjective aspect of consciousness. This activity is thus seen to be subjective in its origin, and to direct itself toward the external.

If we examine the effect, in consciousness, of this impulsive tendency, we find that it results in organizing the external aspect of conscious life, and setting it in a definite relation to the subject, or ego. In this process there may be noticed a peculiar interaction between interest and impulse. For, while interest or feeling tends to awaken and fix the mind's attention, it also happens that attention, being fixed on the mental state, tends to organize its external aspect and set it in a definite relation to the subject. These modes, however, despite their interest, are found to succeed one another in an order, over which this impulsive tendency has no absolute control. These former modes, however, though losing their immediate interest, linger in consciousness in the form of memory. Thus a new attribute postulates itself as belonging to mind—that of *retention*.

These successive modes being capable of being retained in consciousness, and differing in their affective values, the mind's activity is further directed toward their qualitative differences or develops a power of comparison. This, however, as a form of judgment issues into a form of practical thought, in which one end of the comparison is cognized as preferable to the other. Here the mind's interest takes the form of desire, while its primary impulse, being thus rationalized, or directed by a form of thought, becomes an activity of will. Summing up this progress of the mind's primary casual activity, we may notice the following stages in its growth into a rational will, directing its energy to the attainment of a desired end.

- 1st. That primary subjective impulse, in which the mind gives a passive attention to its qualitative modes. In this stage the mind acts only on such elements as may be given it from external stimuli. Through its unifying power, however, it tends to associate these as they arise in consciousness.
- 2nd. As a result of the aforesaid interaction of interest and attention, and through its retentive power, the mind gains the power of analyzing these elements of consciousness, and fixing its attention on those possessing the greater interest for the self.
- 3rd. This will necessarily lead to a third stage, in which the mind, acting through some present interest, will be able to direct its flow of energy toward the accomplishment of a fixed end. Here it will select from its store of experience only such elements as conduce to the attainment of the end in view.

From the above consideration, it will appear that, if the conscious subject is to obtain freedom from its physical environment, this must be effected through its mental activity. A perfect life must result from a life of rational activity. This fact is further proven from a consideration of the relation in which these ideas stand to the subject. These are not viewed as ends in themselves; but are considered as means to be applied to human progress, and thus aid in the realization of the self.

This is sufficient of itself to establish the prominence of mental activity as a factor in self-realization—an important consideration for the scientific educator.

At this point a new factor is to be considered. It has been seen that, through its inherent qualities, the subject will be enabled to retain, as a part of its conscious experience, impressions of the earlier actions and reactions of its primary activity. This signifies an ability, on the part of the subject, of expressing its future activity in terms of the past. Thus, through the development of this new factor, man will now be enabled, with premeditation, to seize the conditions of his environment and facilitate his adjustment thereto. In other words, man's impulsive activity becomes, not only rationalized, but also habituated.

This tendency of intelligent life, to reduce its activities to habits and so determine its future experience, at once raises an important question. We have discovered that man must realize himself by a life of activity, which shall extend intelligently the range of his conscious life. This implies that present modes of existence are not, in many cases at least, to be viewed as ends in themselves, but as stages in a forward progression. Will not the habituation of man's activities, however, rather tend to check such a rational extension, by reducing them to an automatic tendency to act in a fixed direction? That such a result may follow is evident; by what means, if any, this tendency is to be overcome, must appear from subsequent investigation.

Again, it has been seen that, in his realization in consciousness of an external world, man develops a power of comparison which enables him to judge qualitative differences. At this point, there occurs what may be called a transference of feeling. These subjective qualities are cognized as belonging to the external object. The sweetness is in the sugar—the pain in the fire. This transference of feeling at once gives an emotional value to the external object, and leads the mind to view it as an end in itself. Does not this also indicate a point at which the subject's further development must be checked; since the growth of these desires postulates a life of particular pleasure, rather than a life of universal self-realization?

Here, then, we discover a further crucial stage in the development of intelligent consciousness. That these imperfect ends will present themselves, experience abundantly demonstrates. That their pursuit will check the growth of self-knowledge, and the realization of a perfect life, both experience and science abundantly prove. How are these dangers to be overcome?

It was noticed at an earlier stage in our inquiry that the possibility of realizing a life of perfection would imply, not only a potentiality of perfection in the subject, but also an actual perfection in the external world, through which the perfection of the subject may be realized. Are we now in a position to prove the presence of such an external perfection? Thus far we have viewed man only as taking an interest in, and directing his activities towards external objects, in so far as they possess value through being useful to the individual. At this stage, however, a new condition arises. These external objects, though individually desirable, in being subjected to the unifying power of the ego, frequently excite trains of associated ideas which realize a new potentiality of conscious life—the expression of a perfect harmony including both the subject and the external objects. In this new form of subjective interest, the pleasure is found to be distinct from the former value of the object as useful. Our interest is now centred on the external, because we have realized in it a mode of consciousness in which truth is discovered, clothed with subjective emotion—an expression of a harmony inherent in the nature of the conscious subject. Thus the presence of an *Æsthetic Sense* implies both a potentiality of perfection in the thinking subject, and also a perfection in the universal aspect of the external.

This *æsthetic sense*, in addition to possessing an emotional element, has also been seen to be a form of thought, in which the conscious subject cognizes and realizes a harmony of ideas. From such a cognition man is led to conceive a universal harmony throughout the physical world. This new ideal, as an expression of the perfect life of the subject, will possess an interest capable of subordinating the former objects of desire

to a higher unity. Thus the mind through its own activity has been enabled further to rationalize its former individual desires, and subject them to a higher universal ideal.

Thus far we have considered man only in relation to his physical environment. But, as was previously noticed, his developing freedom may be conditioned or restricted by other intelligences. Are these to be avoided, or also realized in conscious life?

Both nature and experience have solved for us this problem. Man's very existence is bound up with that of the family; and, though we may conceive some Platonic state in which the family experience shall disappear, this result will be obtained, only by substituting some other form for the social relation. This narrow circle, whatever it may be, must, of necessity, become most intimately known, and thus develop a desire for social life. This question is further answered by the very conditions of mental development. No intelligence can develop beyond the possibilities of the social environment in which it is placed. It appropriates and objectifies largely by virtue of the culture and opportunities of the society to which it belongs. Its most original efforts are but an explicit expression of the potentialities of this social organism. It is evident, therefore, that to shut the mind off from the greater social circle is but to limit the free activity and development of life. We may, then, predicate, as a necessary quality of perfect conscious life, an adjustment to a social environment.

In relating himself to this social environment, man will become cognizant of individuals similar to himself, and seeking a similar realization of self. Here the individual must realize himself through a process similar to that by which he obtains freedom and development in the physical world. This external social world, as possessing value for the individual, will also tend to the formation of individual desires and aversions, in the pursuit of which man must check his progress toward a perfect realization of the social self. These desires must also be rationalized and subjected to a higher and more perfect unity. Here man must recognize himself as belonging to a social organism in which the

happiness of each is advanced by the perfection of the whole. By what intelligent process is this to be effected?

We have seen that, in his æsthetic conception of the external world, man also realizes a potentiality of perfection inherent in the thinking subject. This realization of his potentiality of perfection, at once creates an idea of oughtness, or enables the mind to contrast its actual with an ideally perfect condition. Further, as out of the recognition of this æsthetic harmony, there arose the conception of perfection in the universal aspect of the physical world, so will it develop a similar ideal in the social world, where the individual will recognize his particular self as part in a higher unity. Here the former sense of beauty appears as a sense of purity, and knowledge as conscience, or a sense of duty including both aspects of this universal idea—duty to self and duty to others.

Such an ideal social organism is supposed to exist for the individual in the state or nation. If this be true, man must realize the perfection of his social nature in terms of the political society to which he belongs. It will, therefore, be necessary for us to consider more closely the true relation of the individual to the nation.

It has been said that the family precedes the nation, as the individual does the family. While this may be physically true, as regards the first stages of national life, we find the very opposite to hold good in the intelligent relationship existing between the individual and the nation in the advanced stages of civilization. Like the individual, the nation that is truly national is a living and unified organism. It lives not to itself alone, but moves ever on, guided by a spiritual impulse, to the realization of its mission to humanity. Further, it has been seen that the individual can realize his potentialities only in terms of the culture and experience of this social organism. Instead, then, of the individual being above the nation, the individual will be found to realize through these national institutions, whatever he possesses of intellectual and moral permanence in his character.

Here we have arrived at the second great stage in the development of life, where man will seek his self-realization as a social being, under control of this universal law of duty, or of the good of the social whole.

At this point, however, it may be asked, why these higher and more universal ideals are held to be sufficiently strong to subdue earlier desires, even though the latter be strengthened by habituation. It has been seen that these universal ideals give expression to forms of thought, in which the individual realizes the potentiality of perfection inherent in his nature. Being thus a partial expression of the individual's perfection, these ideals, if intelligently realized, must possess an impulsive force greater than any particular sources of mental activity; since their violation would imply self-destruction in the intelligent and moral life. Thus the full development of æsthetic and moral ideals will tend, not only to subordinate the subject's desires, but also to bring them, in spite of former habit, under rational control. These universal ideals must, therefore, be most potent factors in the realization of a life of perfection.

While postulating, however, that man can develop, only in and through his physical and social environment, we cannot predicate these as ends in themselves. Experience shows that social organisms are themselves susceptible to changes and readjustments, that advance or retrogression is also their destiny. Thus arises a new problem. Though, in the physical world, man may have subdued his desires to a rational will, though, in the social world, he seeks his self-realization only in the good of the whole, he yet finds his being circumscribed and his freedom limited. In nature, he still vaguely feels great forces which he can neither comprehend nor subdue. In the social world, he is constantly reminded that humanity is wider than the nation, and that these are but elements in a wider field of progress.

Though the conditions of life have placed a bar to the realization of perfect freedom and knowledge, they have not, however, set a check to the subject's activity. By so advancing that, in part at least, his perfection has been realized through a physical and social environment, he is enabled, by his activities

working on these materials, to transcend the fields of actual experience, and to apprehend this perfection as an ideal, and prefigure an absolute good, as the goal of his growing personality. Thus he rises, by his spiritual activity, into a religious life, in which his national life is recognized as but playing a part in the wider field of human progress. Here let us leave him, if not perfected in wisdom, at least purified and rendered felicitous through the ideal representation of The Perfect Will.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SCOPE OF EDUCATION.

As a result of our examination into the nature and development of conscious life, we shall now be enabled the better to estimate the probable aid which formal education can render toward its normal development. Before passing to the consideration of this question, however, we shall briefly consider some objections which are offered against the existence of a normative science of education.

By some it is objected, that, though life undoubtedly possesses a supreme value, yet no effort of man can determine its spiritual development. This is the result of divine grace, and all intellectual development is but foolishness. Without objecting in any way as to the presence and need of such a divine grace, we would nevertheless ask such to consider whether this grace is foreign to, or inherent in, the life of man. Is man to lie with drooping sails, waiting for the wafting breeze of a lingering deity, or to work out his own salvation "with fear and trembling"? By the religious sentiment is meant the recognition of a supreme power for happiness and good, and the subjection of the individual will thereto. Does the conception of such a supreme power come as an external revelation to men sitting in dark places? If so, then the perfect law is foreign to us—we are still under the bondage of fear. If, on the other hand, it is claimed that we have, through grace, become children of the light, then is this light within us and revealed in terms of our conscious life. But how can such be the case, unless that conscious life contains material for such a revelation? That such a condition is necessary, history itself clearly demonstrates. For, only in so far as man has become an actor and an interpreter, only as he has discovered reason and goodness in the

physical and the social world, has he risen into a religious life. Further, it has been seen that man possesses within him an inherent germ of causality, and that within his environment are fields of activity for the awakening and development of an ideal of perfection. Is it not more rational, then, to suppose that in and through these lies the perfect path of divine grace? If such be the case, the question still remains whether a science of education may not point out the line of least resistance for such a development of the religious sentiment.

With the second class of objectors, the futility of formal education arises from a totally different source. With these, life is but a link in an external chain of causation, and, therefore, determined solely by the antecedent links in this chain. Thus life is not able to be modified by subjective effort. But the realization of the self in conscious life has been seen to be the result of the adjusting of subjective and objective terms in consciousness, through the presence of an inherent impulsive, or causation power. The perfecting of conscious life, therefore, is not a result of the mere presence of antecedent external forces. These, at best, are but factors in a higher product. Consciousness is self-determined, and self-activity is a primary feature in the development of conscious life. The question, therefore, again presents itself, "May education in any way direct and develop this inherent force in such a way as to condition the ultimate realization of a life of perfection?"

With the third class, the objections are more general. This class, though agreeing that man is susceptible of education, claim that he acquires so large and so varied a knowledge in the ordinary experiences of life, that it is beyond the power of the scientific educator to direct or to check this natural process. That such a disparity exists between these two fields of experience, no one will deny; that it renders futile any effort to secure a normal development in conscious life may still, however, remain an open question.

The consideration of this problem at once involves a new question, "Is the value of conscious experience to be decided solely by its quantitative aspect?" If so, this objection may be

considered fatal to the claims of formal education ; since education can furnish but a minimum of this experience. If, however, the perfection of the subject lies not in the quantity of its experiences, so much as in their nature and relation to one another, and to the thinking subject, then the force of this objection at once vanishes. To decide this, we need but to refer to facts already discovered. In our last chapter it was seen that the perfecting of the individual does not consist in the building up of a group of individual states, but rather in the reconciliation of all the facts of experience, by subjecting them to a higher or more universal self. If education is able to assist in the realization of this higher self, it may still make good its claims as a science of life.

From facts already observed, we are now in a position to postulate certain leading principles which underlie the progression of conscious life toward this universal ideal.

- 1st. The realization of the self in consciousness results primarily from subjective or mental activity. Through his activity of attention, man must comprehend the external world in consciousness, and apprehend himself through the external world. Further, by this same activity he must discover his true relation to the universe about him, and adapt himself thereto.
- 2nd. Since this apprehension of the external world, physical and social, will result in the formation of particular desires, these are to be subordinated by being brought into higher and more universal relations. This is to be effected primarily by the development of the æsthetic sense in the physical, and of the moral sense in the social world. As a result of such an intelligent apprehension of the universal, individual effort will be converted into moral energy.
- 3rd. Since man is unable, both in the physical and the social world, to find a complete expression for this potentiality of perfection inherent in his nature, his conscious life must be so spiritualized that he may give an ideal expression to his awakened conception of universal perfection.

What means does formal education offer for the bringing about of these results?

It has been postulated that man's intellectual and moral progress is primarily conditioned by his own consciously determined effort. This premiss is further established by the history of human progress. All primitive races lack foresight and self-restraint, and are wanting in intellectual tenacity. They shun labor of every form, and yield themselves to a life of indolence. Being wanting in intellectual and moral energy, they become slaves to their natural impulses and passions. Here, then, we discover another reason for assuming that the essence of human progress lies in mental activity. If, therefore, the educator is able, by any means, to insure the development of this power, he will have contributed in no small degree toward the realization of a life of perfection.

To enter into a complete psychological examination of the function of attention in the development of intelligent consciousness would carry us beyond the limits of our subject. We shall, therefore, content ourselves with such a brief outline of the role of attention, as will enable us logically to affirm the possibility of its formal development. It has been seen that the most primary facts of conscious life present a two fold aspect, subjective and objective, and that these can be organized and set in a definite relation to each other only through the interaction of interest and attention. Thus the most elementary percepts involve an exercise of this inherent power. These modes were further seen to be capable of being retained as related parts in the content of conscious life. This, however, implies not only cognition but recognition, in which this power of attention again appears as an important element. It may further be noted, that these primary cognitions possess a general character, and awaken a feeling of sameness. For instance, in the early cognitions of the child, all members of a class appear the same. In passing to a higher stage of knowledge, not only must these primary elements of perception be reproduced vividly in memory, but the mind's activity must clearly realize, by analysis and comparison, the exact characteristics of each.

Finally, only in so far as the mind secures the power of concentrating its attention upon these ideas, and thereby making them vivid and distinct, are they found capable of entering into the higher relations necessary for the universalizing of subject and object. Is education able to seize on these successive phases of mental activity, and assist in their development?

It has been seen that attention is primarily awakened through a passive interest attached to the conscious mode. This interest, however, may develop into a higher form. Man is both a sentient and a rational being. As a rational being his interest may be affected through the satisfaction of his rational nature, so that the very pursuit of knowledge will become an object of pleasure. It is through this inherent desire for self-realization that the scientific educator must seek to secure the development of rational activity.

It has been seen that conscious life exhibits a unifying tendency, which tendency is realized through the discovery of law and order in the physical and social worlds. Here lies the special opportunity of the scientific educator. For, while the lessons of daily experience are too varied and disconnected for the proper awakening and development of this rational principle in man, the scientific educator, having control over the materials of study, is able to present his facts in such an order as will satisfy this rational tendency, and lead to the acquisition of mental power. This liberty of selection will possess two advantages. Firstly, the educator is enabled to present his materials in conformity with the activities to be exercised. In this way he is able to present the thinking subject with such materials as will best conduce to cultivate the several phases of its mental activity. Secondly, by presenting material capable of organization and unification, he enables the mind to reconstruct itself in conformity with its rational unifying tendency. This, however, since man has a rational nature, must lead to the creation of a desire for rational activity; as a result of which, truth will be followed for its own sake.

This foundation principle of scientific education, though so evident and so easily obtainable, is, we fear, too frequently

violated. By looking upon our pupils as the possessors of a single ready-made faculty—that of retention—we are too prone to consider it our highest function to pour into this receptacle the maximum of externally organized information, rather than considering it our office simply to lead the thinking subject to conscious activity, and self-realization, through his own active organization of skilfully presented material. Even after recognizing this principle, and seeking to apply it in our formal presentation of new material, we are still too liable to violate it in other particulars.

The present thesis is not intended as an exposition of particular methods; we shall pause, however, to make a single reference. How often, after leading our pupils to a rational discovery of some scientific principle, are we satisfied, in its application to an extended field of examples, to convert our lessons into mere expositions, in which our more intelligent pupils perform the function of lecturers to their less fortunate companions. If we desire, however, to promote the intellectual progress of these weaker vessels, let us remember that this must come from the self-activity consciously extending itself into these new fields, and incorporating them with the subject's former experiences. We would, therefore, postulate as an ideal principle, that, with every pupil, the method must be, not one of information but one of self-discovery, in which the teacher shall but direct the activity of the pupil in the latter's search for similarities and differences, to enable him consciously to realize the hidden unity.

In leaving this section of our subject, a word of explanation may be necessary. We have stated that the chief office of the educator is to present to the child such material as will enable him to develop and organize his own consciousness through intelligent effort. Does this imply that the educator is to make as easy as possible the mental efforts of the pupil? It has been seen that, as a rational being, man is capable of deriving pleasure from the intelligent exercise of his activities. The development of this tendency was seen to be of the highest importance in insuring a life of rational activity. Such power, however, can

develop only through a proper degree of self-conscious effort. It is, therefore, neither necessary nor desirable that the teacher should make easy the conscious effort of his pupils; but rather that he should so present his materials that his pupils, through an earnest effort of attention, may arrive at thorough and complete knowledge.

While postulating the importance of a life of rational activity, we have further seen that this is not sufficient of itself to constitute a life of perfection. Nay, when expending itself simply as an analytic process, it may even become individualistic and destructive in its tendency. We have seen, however, that the perfect man must be led to realize such a universal unity as will cause him to refuse to be limited by the particular and the finite. What further assistance are we able to offer thereto?

It has been shown that particular desires and aversions can be rationalized only by the universalization of the individual through the conception of order and perfection in the external world, and a consequent ideal of universal self-realization, as the goal of the subject's rational activity. Here, also, the scientific educator, through the nature of the materials by which he exercises and organizes the minds of his pupils, is afforded special opportunities for awakening this conception of a universal order. The materials to be presented in an ideal course of study should be of such a nature as, not only to appeal to the past experience of the pupil, and thus enable him to distinguish their several phases, but also to admit of entering into ever wider and higher relations. By this means, the educator is enabled to afford such exercises as will direct the conscious activity into a higher channel—the search for more universal relations. This exercise, as furnishing an expression for the tendency for unification, inherent in the individual, will speedily develop into a conscious habit. Here lies the second great opportunity of the scientific educator—that of developing such a synthetic attitude of mind.

It was noted that the cultivation of the æsthetic must play an important role in the breaking down of the individual nature and the development of universal ideals. We may now notice that in the awakening of this unifying or synthetic attitude of

mind, lies the very germ of the æsthetic sense. "Beauty is truth, truth beauty." Every discovery of higher relations in the field of individual experience is a metaphor and a poem, while the appreciation of the beauty of an object involves a unification, more or less conscious, of analyzed objects. Therefore, in the presentation of materials considered the most dry and uninviting, when, in addition to the apprehension of certain individual facts, you are able to lead the pupil to discover the presence of these higher syntheses, be assured that you will also have vibrated the chords of beauty and of goodness. Again, when our hearts are touched by a conception of harmony arising from the contemplation of some æsthetic object, you may be further assured that this conception of beauty will also unfold a vision of universal truth and unity. As has been seen, moreover, the awakening of this æsthetic sense involves an explicit emotional element, and thus gives a more impulsive expression to our inherent susceptibility to universal truth and beauty; and, by tending to render active the desire to realize this universal ideal, will lay a foundation for moral character. Here, then, let education perform its possible functions in the perfecting of conscious life, by developing such a habit of synthesis that the mind will be enabled intelligently to grasp presentations of unity and harmony, and by so awakening images of beauty (and, therefore, of truth) that the mind may learn both to know and to love the beautiful and the good. In this department, also, the educator will have every advantage over ordinary experience, through his freer command over the presented materials.

A word may be added here also, as to our method in the presentation of the products of creative art. An artistic production is not an objective imitation but the outward expression of an inward, universal ideal. It is to be viewed, therefore, not simply as an object for dissection and analysis, but as a synthetic unity whose beauty is constituted by the harmony of its several parts. For example, in Milton's—

"Right against the Eastern gate
Where the great Sun begins his state
Robed in flames and amber light,
The clouds in thousand liveries dight ;"

or in Shelley's—

"Night followed, clad with stars."

or again in Longfellow's—

"After a day of cloud and wind and rain
Sometimes the setting sun breaks out again,
And, touching all the darksome woods with light,
Smiles on the fields, until they laugh and sing,"

we obtain a revelation of the harmony and beauty of nature which the most careful observations of ordinary experience might fail to reveal. In such an interpretation, therefore, the pupil will be enabled, both to realize these spiritual potentialities within his own inner life, and to prefigure that higher universal, toward which his rational activities would direct him. On the emotional side also, the feeling produced will develop from a sensuous interest in the local, into a contemplation of the ideal for its own sake, and thus cause the mind to transcend individual desires, and elevate its interests into the region of rational sentiment.

Thus far, we have outlined only the opportunities afforded the formal educator for the development of the intelligent and the æsthetic. But, as we have seen, man is also a social being, and, as such, his development must take place in and through a social organism. As an heir of civilization, his complete self-realization will imply an entrance upon that heritage. These primary factors, however, are essential to its attainment. We are likewise children of nature; and it is in nature that we must find a basis for this higher development. Though moral training, therefore, may be the higher, it presupposes the intellectual and the æsthetic for its perfect attainment.

For, as was seen, morality consists in an identification of the self with a social environment. This implies the apprehension of a universal good, and a distinction of right and wrong in human conduct, as related thereto. These, however, are forms of practical thought, and, therefore, imply a rational element in the moral sense. This fact is also verified by the history of social progress. Social reforms, to be effective, must always be preceded by, and founded on public opinion; while this opinion

will be found, in turn, to rest on some form of knowledge. This fact is established by a reference to any of our social reformations, which are always found to have been preceded by an intellectual revival. An example is furnished in our own day in the evident decline of the drinking habit, as a result of the knowledge of the effects of alcoholism—an instrument which, in an unseen manner, is effecting more than a century of legislative enactments.

But morality is also a sentiment. To choose the good, we must both know and love it. Nay, with some the presence of this moral sentiment is viewed as all-sufficient; and, though we may not admit so much, we must nevertheless agree with the poet, that there may be those—

"Who in love and truth
Where no misgiving is, rely
Upon the genial sense of youth:
Glad Hearts! without reproach or blot;
Who do thy work, and know it not."

The development of feeling, therefore, is essential to moral progress—to our own "light" we must add "sweetness." But, as has been seen, it is from the cultivation of the æsthetic emotions that such a disinterested sentiment can have its foundation most securely laid. Then—

"With Thought and Love companions of our way,
Whate'er the senses take or may refuse,
The mind's internal heaven shall shed her dews
Of inspiration on the humblest lay."

Morality has been shown to consist in the realization of the self in harmony with a social environment. But our primary interest in this environment was seen to be in the form of particular desires, and, therefore, selfish in its character. Such an individual existence, by separating man from his environment will cause him to view his own personality as limited thereby. This must lead him to seek his freedom independent of, or in opposition to others—in acts of selfishness and injustice. The moral man, however, must learn that such efforts in reality check his free development, which can be attained only through the freedom of the whole, or in practising the good.

The nature of the environment in which man has been set

by the Creator would seem to have been determined by the necessity for such a development. As an individual, he is set in a physical environment, where his very existence is dependent on an adjustment thereto. Thus he is at once drawn out, as it were, from self and interested in an external world. Again, his existence is made to depend on the family, where this individual nature must be further subdued by the creation of interests and desires which include other members of the family group. To widen his personality still further, he finds the nation embracing the narrower family group, and leading him into a yet more universal existence. Thus, step by step, the very conditions of his environment tend to guide him to the highest summit, where his individuality shall merge into a single universal. Can the conscious effort of the educator assist in this progress.

Conduct, to be moral, must present two phases. The moral man must know and love the right. Secondly, he must choose and do it. In the first of these spheres, at least, the educator is afforded special opportunities of preparing his pupil for moral living. The history of civilization is the history of man's strivings for intellectual and moral freedom. This civilization has crystallized itself in innumerable forms, and remains standing for our edification. Here we will find objectified the lessons of human progress; and if our hearts have been attuned to truth and beauty, we cannot but learn, from the contemplation of these lessons, to love the good in human action. Here, therefore, we have a field for moral education. No doubt, in the presentation of all intelligently organized materials, since they represent a product of human intelligence, there may be found a moral value. But it will now be the province of the educator to select from these products, and to set forth such material as shall constitute the highest expression of morality.

The importance of this department of our subject will warrant a more extended examination. We have pointed out the important role which literature may play, in the cultivation of the æsthetic feelings. We may now note that it should play no less a part in the development of the moral sentiment. The moral progress of the human race has been seen to have been a struggle for freedom and self-realization in a family, social and

spiritual environment. Literature is an expression, an outward projection, of this inner struggle for freedom and morality. For example, in Milton's—

"peace hath her victories
No less renowned than war."

or in Bryant's—

"He who from zone to zone
Guides through the boundless sky thy certain flight,
In the long way that I must tread alone
Will lead my steps aright,"

we realize moral and spiritual ideals to which a life of ordinary experience might scarcely give expression. Here, then, the moral educator will have an opportunity of presenting noble ideas and examples, which cannot fail to realize the potentialities of our moral nature.

In history, also, the teacher possesses an abounding field for the selection of moral materials. Even on its biographical side, it possesses a dramatic interest, and affords a sensuous expression which cannot fail to realize ideas of goodness, and create an interest therein. But history is more than a collection of individual biographies. It exemplifies the social organism, and as such, sets forth the unity of that organism. It must, therefore, necessarily possess materials whose presentation will tend to realize explicitly in man the potentialities of his social nature.

Other fields might be exemplified, but these will probably suffice for our purpose. We would remark, however, that here, as in the former departments, we must recognize the necessity of a selection and arrangement of materials. The teacher must consider both the logical order of his materials, and their psychological adaptability for promoting the self-realization of the moral subject.

At this point, it may be objected that such a presentation of moral ideals, while resulting in a knowledge of the moral law, cannot result in the formation of moral character. We must not only know but choose and do the right. The essence of character formation, therefore, must consist in action; and, without such an active application, the highest product can be but a

moral sentiment. That these ideals become fixed only in and through their application to right living, no one will deny. But, on the other hand, we may claim that no moral progress can result except through the influence of moral ideals, more or less distinctly felt and known. Moral development is a conscious effort, and, as we have already seen, these ideals having been awakened, they must tend to apply themselves in action. The real question at issue, then, is this, "Does the daily life of the child afford a field of activity, within which these ideals may be actively applied?" Such a field of activity, a public school system and normal home life will surely afford. This question, however, should guide us in the selection of our materials of study, and would be a consideration of special importance to those undertaking the moral elevation of classes or tribes of a lower social and moral status than that which has produced the materials, through the application of which moral reform is to be effected.

The perfection of life, however, implies more than a life of morality. This, in itself, will fail to uphold amid the trials and hardships which overtake the natural man. Perfect freedom implies, not only the realization of a universal good, but also the submission of the individual will thereto. The old self must be sacrificed in a life of self-renunciation. Thus the religious life appears, as the crown of human effort, wherein alone man can find that ideal of universal goodness, which postulates itself as the ultimate goal of the struggles of experience. Here, when the individual life, o'erwhelmed, perchance, by unmerited misfortunes, presents no ray of hope, when society offers no adequate expression of the deeper longing of the inner life, man may yet find an everlasting light leading into the land of righteousness—a solution of the mystery of Life. Can the effort of the educator assist in leading thereto?

To answer this question will demand an inquiry into the source of the religious sentiment. The religious sentiment may be traced to two different sources—the one external, the other internal. Dogmatic religion holds up to man an authoritative creed, enforced by a system of rewards and punishments. Religion is here viewed as a foreign law, not inherent in man,

who is by nature sinful, but revealed externally to him. Such a conception of religion, with its accompanying doctrines, must necessarily remove it from the sphere of the scientific educator. Theological religion, with its clustering dogmas, however pure and majestic, cannot organize itself into an educational system which aims at the realization of a potentiality of perfection affirmed to be inherent in man.

But is this the highest conception of religion? It has been shown that man, as a rational being, is capable of realizing an ideal of perfection. Thus it becomes possible for this law to be revealed within us—written in the heart. Here religion finds its truest and most permanent expression; since it results, not in subduing man to external authority, but in a reconciliation through the lifting of manhood into God. In such a conception of the religious life, man obtains an explicit realization of universal perfection, adequate to the upward struggle of his self-conscious life; and a religious ideal is postulated, toward the attainment of which education may afford assistance.

For in such a conception of the religious life, faith is found to rest on a definite rational foundation. Here humanity must identify itself with God, through the apprehension of its own divinity. Such an apprehension, however, implies the realization of a universal cosmos, in which man can discover an expression of his own inward aspirations. If such be the case, a truly religious life implies the realization of meaning in both the outer and the inner world, and a rational faith therein. Thus science, art and morality must become the basis for the truly religious life, which must include every phase of existence that will harmonize into a life of universal perfection. Education, therefore, in so far as it is able to lead man to adjust himself harmoniously to a physical and social environment, and discover therein signs of universal truth, beauty and goodness, will have laid the broadest foundation for an intelligent religious life.

In closing this section, we would again emphasize what, we believe, should be made a leading principle in every system of education. From the foregoing, it must appear that the efficacy of education will consist, not in an attempt to store the mind

with an abundance of facts, but in so developing man's rational nature (intellectual, æsthetic and moral) that it may be capable, in the experiences of life, of returning unto itself, and of judging its present conscious mode by these universal ideals of truth, beauty and goodness. Such is the special purpose of an education which may truly be termed liberal, and the educator who aims thus to arm those committed to his care, will have prepared them in no small degree to discover truth, however revealed, to feel a divinity in the order and beauty of the sensuous world, and to live in peace and love with all mankind.

CHAPTER V.

THE PRESENT PROBLEM OF EDUCATION.

THUS far education has been viewed only in the light of an agent in the development or remaking of the conscious life of the individual. Here it has been supposed to be in possession of an ideal of perfection, toward which it aims to direct the developing consciousness. This would seem to imply that humanity has obtained an absolute standard of perfection, as the goal of self-conscious activity. But man's development was seen to take place in and through a physical and social environment. Progress and development was found to be a mark, not only of the individual, but also of organized humanity. As an individual, therefore, man must develop in harmony with the progress of this higher unity; and, so far as in him lies, assist in the realization of this more universal progress, in which newer and deeper ideals are gradually developing. Hence, if education is to be of real service to human progress, it must aid man to transcend both his natural life and (if possible) the stage of social progress through which he has developed. It must become, not only a follower, but also a leader and a guide to human progress.

To be effective in determining the character and guiding the course of such a development, education must be able, both to grasp the present ideals of human progress, and to read in their present application the character of those potentialities which shall be realized in the future; and which, in their turn, must touch and vivify a following epoch. This implies that, in addition to involving progression or retrogression, civilization will present in its history grounds of inference, through which the educator may project his efforts into the future. Education may then view man as entering upon a future, unseen but not

totally unprepared for. That such is possible the history of civilization abundantly proves. It will be impossible here to enter into an examination of this history, but in every epoch, it will be found to present features which affect the character of its subsequent advance or regression. Though the progress of civilization, therefore, seems a hidden fact, we may see that its general destiny depends upon the nature of the elements which contribute to its spiritual perfection. These have been seen to consist in the intellectual, æsthetic, moral and religious ideals which inspire its rational life, and give expression to its character.

An inquiry into the life and thought of the present generation will show that it is characterized by a scientific or intellectual movement. This has resulted in emancipating man, to a large degree, within his physical environment, and in freeing him from physical fears and superstitions. Accompanying this advance in intellectual knowledge, there has been a moral and spiritual awakening, through which man is becoming conscious of defects in his present social and religious ideals. Thus far, however, in his treatment of them, though swayed by vague doubts and unrest, man has shrunk from applying himself actively to this spiritual problem. The present age, therefore, while marked as highly critical, has not yet passed into an epoch of moral and spiritual reconstruction.

Is this condition to remain permanent? Will man continue to discover order and purpose in the material world, and, having obtained this freedom, shrink from applying the resulting ideals to social and religious problems? This question may find its answer, in a tendency which is already evidently displaying itself in the rising generation. The child of to-day is marked, above all things, by the hope and confidence with which he faces the future. At every step he gives indication of a spirit of freedom, which proclaims that he is not to be bound by the habits and traditions of the past. Already it may be seen extending itself into the younger and less conservative political organisms, and leading them to ignore all past traditions inconsistent with this new impulse. Here we may discover evidences of a power which, scorning the indecision of the present generation, will apply itself boldly to these higher problems.

Whether we are inclined to view this tendency with satisfaction or alarm, it most assuredly exists, and should demand no little attention from the educator. To seek to limit its activity will be to undertake the vain labor of confining the new wine of human progress in the old bottles of a dying epoch; to ignore its presence will be to disinherit the spiritual offspring of our own generation.

To the thoughtful student of human progress, this impulse will appear pregnant with noble possibilities. The present social and religious conscience may be said to be in travail, and yearning for a more adequate interpretation of the problem of life. This, however, can be effected only by a resolute effort to see and know the best that can be realized within these domains. Here, then, is an impulse which, if rightly directed, may develop into a spiritual power that shall do much to realize those more perfect social and religious ideals for which humanity yearns.

While possessing these potentialities for goodness, this impulse displays no less a possibility for evil. It has been seen that the present unrest is associated largely with social and religious ideals. Further, through the progress in the useful arts and sciences, resulting from the intellectual advance of the present century, man has been largely freed from the physical labors of the past. His activities, thus liberated, tend to direct themselves into these higher fields of speculation. As this scientific revival grew out of a prior humanistic movement, so, out of this scientific advancement, is destined to proceed a rationalized humanity. If allowed to develop as an individual tendency, however, this impulse must necessarily expend itself in a destructive warfare against the present ideals of morality and religion.

To direct this new power in such a way that it might become reconstructive, rather than destructive, would be the highest achievement of education. But things spiritual can be apprehended only by the spiritual. Here, at least, "to be carnally minded is death." If, therefore, education is to assist in this reconstruction, her labor must be to lead the coming age to realize itself in the highest terms of the present moral and

spiritual development of the race. In this way only will it be possible, during this renaissance, to add to and enrich our present moral and religious conceptions.

When, however, we turn our attention to the present phase of education, we find it marked by a utilitarian development of the intellect, to the neglect of the moral and the spiritual. As a result of the advance in physical science and the useful arts, education tends to confine itself to the market-place. Within its borders are a thousand specialists, who can see no profit outside of their particular fields; while at the outer gate stand a thousand faddists, each with a single panacea, and that too frequently but a child of the day. This intellectual aspect has further imbedded itself through an incidental effect which it has produced on our conception of educational values. Intellectual development, admitting of a certain relative approximation, its renaissance has been accompanied with a systematic endeavour to gauge intellectual attainments. This tendency finds an expression in the position at present held by the written examination. Having become an end in education, it has set a premium on her more intellectual aspects, which present more scope for the work of the examiner. Thus, though the teacher may proclaim the importance of moral and spiritual education, his efforts are too often limited through the struggle for examination results.

It may be argued that this intellectual education is moral in its tendency. This is no doubt true; but, as was seen, real moral progress demands something more. The physical cannot transcend the moral and the spiritual. It is only by a renaissance of moral and spiritual education, therefore, that we can obtain a sure antidote to the narrowing and individualistic tendencies of the more purely physical and intellectual. By this means alone, can we develop a rational attitude, which, in this work of reconstruction, can view with equanimity the promptings of selfishness, and whose compassion will discover no province of life so obscure that its sympathies may not penetrate. Through such an adjustment of its efforts, therefore, the education of to-day may so guide this new spirit that it shall work out

with joy and sympathy still higher ideals of human destiny ; and thus render fruitful an impulse which, if left to expend itself on selfish and particular ends, must be productive of social and religious anarchy.

It must not be understood from the foregoing, that we would make the end of education some separate and far-off goal. "Education is a reconstruction of experience," and must, therefore, stand in vital connection with the present. Thus every stage in its process, in so far as it discriminates, reconstructs and adapts within the field of experience, may be considered an end in itself. This is but another way of saying that self-realization is the aim of education. As has been seen, however, the perfecting of experience, whether in the individual or in society, is a process, and it is not beyond the scope of the science of education to ascertain whether data may not be obtained in relation thereto.

Before closing this brief outline of formal education, we would add a word as to the qualifications of the most important factor in its rational application—the teacher. Thorough knowledge has always been recognized, at least theoretically, as an essential characteristic of the successful educator. By thorough knowledge, however, has usually been understood a comprehensive grasp of the external materials—the lumber of the temple of knowledge. Such a logical knowledge of the material of his art is undoubtedly essential to the educator ; and, as long as we consider the mind a passive recipient of impressions arising therefrom, might be viewed as all sufficient. But this conception of education, as we believe has been shown, is not in itself adequate. Knowledge has been found to result, not from passive impressions, but from an active self-realization and reconstruction of the subject in and through his social environment. Knowledge, therefore, even in its most primary form, must be more than objective—it must constitute a realization of the self-conscious subject. From this it will appear that the educator's knowledge must be more than logical—it must also be psychological. In other words, the educator must, in addition to reducing his materials to a logical system, also discover their value and place in promoting a realization of the self. From

this it appears that the teacher's knowledge of his materials must be more than a knowledge of objective things. He must likewise know them on their subjective side, or psychologically. Only in this way can he successfully apply them for the purpose of developing and reconstructing self-consciousness in such a way that the realization of a rational physical and social world is immediately combined with the realization of a rational self. If, therefore, the teacher would achieve the true ideal of his art, he must aim to know both the logic and the psychology of the course of study. In this fact, we find the store-house and the key of educational method.

In thus emphasizing the claims of education to be recognized as a spiritual art whose methods are capable of exposition, we do not mean to claim that the educator is to be reduced to a mechanical methodizer. Even the workman does not successfully drive home the nail by constantly watching the swing of hammer and arm. Of all imitators, he who imitates in spiritual things is the most feeble. The teacher must learn, therefore, that, as in the pupil's knowledge, subject and object are not to be set in vital opposition, so in his own art, he cannot separate himself from her logical and spiritual processes; and that he can follow her precepts, only when they have been so realized in consciousness that they may re-issue from the inner fountain of his mind and heart.

Finally, it has been seen that, to attain the possibilities of his art, the educator must seek and find out the very heart and pulse of the spiritual life within which he professes to labor. With wise reverence for the past, he yet moves in a living present, and with hopeful vision, seeks to penetrate into the future of human progress. A lofty ideal, it may be said, to set for the average teacher. Such it undoubtedly is, yet surely none too high for those who should recognize in themselves the humble successors of that Great Teacher who lived and died that He might reveal to man a higher and a nobler life. Could we but rise, in knowledge and in love, to the high responsibility of our office, might we not also, through trial and self-sacrifice, hear this glad response to our labors, "We love him in that he first loved us and gave himself for us"?

